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A COMMON LAW RESURGENCE IN RIGHTS PROTECTION? 
Roger Masterman and Se-shauna Wheatle

 
 
 
Following a period of relative dormancy, the United Kingdom Supreme Court has revitalised the notion 
that the common law might provide effective protection for human rights.  In Osborn v Parole Board, 
Kennedy v Information Commissioner and A v British Broadcasting Corporation the Supreme Court 
has provided support for the suggestion that the common law – and not the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights – should be the primary source of legal authority for a domestic court 
considering an issue of individual rights.  This piece traces this resurgence of common law rights 
reasoning, and assesses the nature of the primacy it seeks to accord to the common law.   
 
Keywords: common law; constitutional rights; Kennedy v Information Commissioner; Human Rights 
Act 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of rights recognised at common law as being constitutional had begun to 
gain a foothold in judicial reasoning prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998.
1
  Judicial statements made early in the life of the Act highlighted ‘the common 
law’s acceptance of constitutional rights’2 and described a harmonious, symbiotic, 
relationship between the common law and the rights prescribed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Influential senior judges championed the latent ability 
of the common law to protect rights within and without the courtroom.
3
 Overtime, 
however, this dynamic shifted and the development of the common law’s abilities to 
defend rights appeared to have been stymied in the face of the Convention’s incoming 
tide. Reliance on the Human Rights Act and, by extension, the ECHR became the 
norm for both judges and advocates alike, and the common law began to fade into the 
background; ‘the attitude of many lawyers and judges in the UK to the Convention 
                                                 

 Durham Law School. Our thanks are due to Helen Fenwick and Hayley Hooper for their comments 
on a previous draft.   
1
 See: R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech (No 2) [1994] Q.B. 198; R. v 
Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] Q.B. 575; R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex parte Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115.   
2
 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] Q.B. 728, 
[71] (Laws LJ). 
3
 See: Lord Cooke of Thorndon ‘The Road Ahead for the Common Law’ (2004) 53 I.C.L.Q. 273; Lord 
Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation amidst an orgy of statutes’ [2004] E.H.R.L.R. 245.  
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was not unlike that of a child to a new toy. As we became fascinated with the new toy, 
the old toy, the common law, was left in the cupboard.’4 
 Recently, however, members of the senior judiciary have lamented the myopia 
provoked by the 1998 Act: ‘[s]ince the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, there 
has too often been a tendency to see the law in areas touched on by the Convention 
solely in terms of the Convention rights.’5 The realisation of this tendency appears to 
underlie a number of United Kingdom Supreme Court decisions that have served to 
re-emphasise the utility of the common law, and the rights inherent in it, as tools of 
constitutional adjudication.  After a period of relative dormancy, the common law is 
being reasserted as an important source of rights protection and the Supreme Court 
has issued a series of strong reminders that recourse to the Convention rights via the 
Human Rights Act is not the only, or even the primary, means of securing and 
enforcing rights within the UK.  
The recent resurgence of the common law as a source of rights protection 
invites us to consider the reasons that the common law fell from grace after early 
indications of its strength, the causes of its re-emergence, and the continuing potential 
for the common law to play a role in safeguarding rights in the HRA (and perhaps 
post-HRA) era.  
 
II. THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 
The enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 raised a series of questions regarding 
the interrelationship between domestic and European sources of authority relating to 
the legal protection of human rights. Initial signals pointed to the potential for 
complementarity. In Rights Brought Home it was suggested that the new regime 
would see a careful weaving of the two distinct, but in many ways complementary,
6
 
sources of law.
7
 Lord Hoffmann noted in Simms that the ‘principles of fundamental 
rights which exist at common law will be supplemented by a specific text’,8 whilst in 
                                                 
4
 Lord Neuberger, ‘The Role of Judges in Human Rights Jurisprudence: A Comparison of the 
Australian and UK Experience’ (8 August 2014), at [29]. 
5
 Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20, at [46]. See also: A v British Broadcasting 
Corporation [2014] UKSC 25; Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61. 
6
 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No.2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109, 283-284.   
7
 Rights Brought Home (1997), Cm.3782, at [1.14].   
8
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 131.  
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2003 Laws LJ stated in International Transport Roth that the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act gave democratic impetus to the common law’s rights jurisprudence.9    
Yet, common law inertia, rather than the consolidation of this symbiotic 
potential, was the consequence of the enactment of the Human Rights Act.
10
  By 2006 
the House of Lords decision in Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
had appeared to confine common law rights to the realms of statutory interpretation.
11
 
As Lord Rodger noted of attempts to attach the ‘constitutional’ label to rights existing 
at common law:  
 
Most of the references to ‘constitutional rights’ are to be found in cases 
dealing with situations before the 1998 Act brought Convention rights into our 
law.  In using the language of ‘constitutional rights’, the judges were, more or 
less explicitly, looking for a means of incorporation avant la lettre, of having 
the common law supply the benefits of incorporation without incorporation.  
Now that the Human Rights Act is in place, such heroic efforts are 
unnecessary: the Convention rights form part of our law and provide a rough 
equivalent of a written code of constitutional rights, albeit one not tailor-made 
for this country.
12
    
  
As Brice Dickson observes, the House of Lords’ decision in Watkins saw ‘the coffin 
lid of constitutional rights … well and truly screwed down.’13 
This apparent shift can be seen to reflect the impact of a confluence of 
practical and constitutional factors. From a pragmatic point of view, while the 
protection of rights and interests through the common law had the benefits of vintage 
and domesticity on its side, it also lacked force and precision. Even Laws LJ – 
                                                 
9
 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] Q.B. 728, 
[71].   
10
 A point also reflected in the judges’ (lack of) reliance on broader common law principles (B. 
Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p.34).  
11
 Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17; [2006] 2 A.C. 395, at [61] -
[62].   
12
 Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17; [2006] 2 A.C. 395, at [64].   
13
 B. Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p.28.  
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perhaps the most forthright judicial advocate of the capabilities of the common law in 
this regard
14
 – pointed to the definitional and normative uncertainty surrounding the 
development of common law constitutional rights, noting that while access to courts 
has been characterised as a constitutional right, ‘the cases do not explain what that 
means.’15 Constitutional common law rights remained embryonic at the point at which 
the Human Rights Act came into force – the categorisation ‘constitutional rights’ was 
‘not one that [was] well supported by precedent at the highest level’.16 By contrast the 
catalogue of rights protected through the Human Rights Act enjoyed the benefit of 
relative convenience and clarity. 
Moreover, there was – and remains – no complete list of rights which the 
common law ranks as constitutional,
17
 and no clear, definitive, guide to determine 
how a right would be categorised as such.  By contrast, while there is an inherent level 
of vagueness in the textual guarantees of human rights, including the Human Rights 
Act and ECHR,
18
 those documents at least provide a codified statement of what those 
rights are, as well as mechanisms for their enforcement. There is no comparable 
definitive statement of common law rights or of the means by which the common law 
can generate its defence of rights.  In the light of this, the appeal to the catalogue of 
enforceable rights, (semi-) structured tests of necessity and proportionality, and 
remedial provisions provided by the Convention rights via the Human Rights Act 
appears obvious.    
Operating within the background are two traditional features of the common 
law that reveal its weakness in the legal defence of human rights. The first is the 
embedded understanding that traditional common law permits certain freedoms to 
individuals, and is a negative assignment of liberties. The orthodox common law 
                                                 
14
 J. Laws, ‘Is the High Court the guardian of fundamental constitutional rights?’ [1993] P.L. 59; J. 
Laws, The Common Law Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).   
15
 R. v Lord Chancellor Ex p Witham [1998] Q.B. 575 , 585G. 
16
 B. Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p.26.  
17
 Though – extra-judicially – Lord Cooke included among their number the right of access to a court 
and to confidential legal advice, the right to a fair trial, the right to equal treatment, and the freedoms of 
expression and religion (Lord Cooke of Thorndon ‘The Road Ahead for the Common Law’ (2004) 53 
I.C.L.Q. 273). 
18
 Aileen Kavanagh, 'The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the Human 
Rights Act 1998' (2004) 24 OJLS 259, 264; Brown v Stott [2003] 1 A.C. 681, 703.  
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understanding that liberty is residual and liable to legislative encroachment without 
effective reply appears feeble in comparison to the European Convention’s more 
affirmative statement of rights that must be guaranteed to persons within the member 
states
19
 and the Human Rights Act’s imposition of duties on public authorities to 
comply to with those rights guarantees.
20
 Even in Lord Hoffmann’s seminal 
articulation of the principle of legality in Simms the common law ultimately 
capitulates to clear legislative intent.
21
   
Secondly, the traditional focus of scrutiny in judicial review was on the 
process by which an administrative decision had been taken.  As Tom Poole has 
noted, the ‘conceptual matrix’ of administrative law,  
 
allowed little room for substantive review – that is, for the (more or less) 
direct examination of the reasonableness of the impugned decision or action.  
Within this framework, rights specifically and substantive review more 
generally were not so much outlawed as repressed.
22
   
 
Administrative law’s conceptual preferences for review rather than appeal and 
examination of process rather than merits combined to ensure that the vindication of 
liberties was not the central concern of pre-Human Rights Act judicial review. And 
despite the availability of ‘anxious scrutiny’ in cases where fundamental rights or 
constitutional principles were at issue, domestic judicial review still fell short of the 
expectation of review on the basis of the Convention rights.
23
 In the eyes of the 
Strasbourg court, even the heightened ‘anxious scrutiny’ approach was unable to 
provide an effective remedy for potential infringements of the Convention rights for 
the reason that: 
 
                                                 
19
 Article 1, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 
20
 Human Rights Act 1998, s.6.  
21
 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 131.   
22
 T. Poole, ‘The Reformation of English Administrative Law’ (2009) 68 C.L.J. 142, 143.   
23
 Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20, at [245]-[247] (Lord Carnworth). 
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it effectively excluded any consideration by the domestic courts of the 
question of whether the interference with the applicant’s rights answered a 
pressing social need or was proportionate to the … aims pursued.24 
 
The potency of the common law as an instrument of rights protection was therefore in 
considerable doubt prior to the enactment of the 1998 Act, and Human Rights Act 
review was speedily embraced as a panacea. But, over a decade on, the very 
perception that the common law is not up to the task of rights protection is being 
challenged and a number of recent Supreme Court decisions have served as forceful 
reminders of the continuing utility of the common law to human rights adjudication in 
the United Kingdom.   
 
III. THE RESURGENCE OF THE COMMON LAW 
In the 2013 decision in Osborn v Parole Board – concerning the circumstances under 
which a convicted prisoner would be entitled to an oral hearing before a parole board 
– Lord Reed took the opportunity to highlight what he saw to be an error in the 
argument of the appellants (and in advocacy more broadly), namely to assume that 
‘because an issue falls within the ambit of a Convention guarantee, it follows that the 
legal analysis of the problem should begin and end with the Strasbourg case law.’25  
Lord Reed, with whom each of the remaining Justices of the Supreme Court agreed, 
noted that the presumption in favour of the precedence of Convention case-law was 
questionable for both substantive and structural reasons.  First, for the reason that the 
Convention rights themselves are expressed at a ‘very high level of generality’26 that 
is ‘too unspecific to provide the guidance which is necessary in a state governed by 
the rule of law.’27  It follows, and is an expectation of the Convention organs28, that 
the Convention rights ‘have to be fulfilled at national level through a substantial body 
of much more specific domestic law.’29   Lord Reed continued by noting that the 
Human Rights Act 1998 – though of unquestionable importance – does not 
                                                 
24
 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493, at [138].   
25
 Osborn, at [63].  
26
 Osborn, at [55]. 
27
 Osborn, at [56]. 
28
 Osborn, at [56]. 
29
 Osborn, at [55].   
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necessarily ‘supersede the protection of human rights under the common law or 
statute, or create a discrete body of law based upon the judgments of the European 
court’30 for the reason that the Convention rights were intended to permeate our legal 
system.
31
  Citing the Court of Appeal decision in R. (Guardian News and Media Ltd) 
v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court,32 Lord Reed observed that ‘the 
development of the common law did not come to an end on the passing of the Human 
Rights Act 1998.’33  
 Lord Mance took up the baton in Kennedy v Information Commissioner – in 
which the Supreme Court issued a forceful statement of the capacity of domestic law 
in general, and the common law in particular, to secure access to information – noting 
that the ‘natural starting point in any dispute is to start with the domestic law, and it is 
certainly not to focus exclusively on the Convention rights, without surveying the 
wider common law scene.’34  Lord Toulson added that the common law, by way of its 
incremental development, had evolved over time in order to respond to new demands 
and challenges
35
 but noted that the passing of the Human Rights Act had, however, 
given rise to a ‘baleful and unnecessary tendency to overlook the common law.’36  As 
a result, Lord Toulson felt that it should be emphasised that ‘it was not the purpose of 
the Human Rights Act that the common law should become an ossuary.’37  
 The ‘importance of the continuing development of the common law in areas 
falling within the scope of the Convention guarantees’ was also subsequently 
addressed in A v British Broadcasting Corporation.
38
  In A, Lord Reed took the 
opportunity to reiterate that the existing common law principles – in this decision 
relating to open justice – should provide a court’s starting point. He expressed 
confidence – ‘given the extent to which the Convention and our domestic law … walk 
                                                 
30
 Osborn, at [57]. 
31
 Osborn, at [55].   
32
 [2013] Q.B. 618.  
33
 Osborn, at [61]. 
34
 Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20, at [46].   
35
 Kennedy, at [133]. 
36
 Kennedy, at [133]. 
37
 Kennedy, at [133].  
38
 A v British Broadcasting Corporation [2014] UKSC 25.  
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in step, and bearing in mind the capacity of the common law to develop’39 – that the 
common law and Convention would be in harmony, but took care to note the more 
exacting requirements of proportionality analysis:  
 
… although the Convention and our domestic law give expression to common 
values, the balance between those values, when they conflict, may not always 
be struck in the same place under the Convention as it might once have been 
under our domestic law.  In that event, effect must be given to the Convention 
rights in accordance with the Human Rights Act.
40
  
 
So though the common law should provide the foundation from which a rights claim 
might proceed, Lord Reed recognised that updating may be required in order to 
achieve the same result as would be achieved via application of the Convention rights 
and that the ‘balance’ struck through application of the tests for necessity and 
proportionality may need to prevail in order to make good the commitment embodied 
in the Human Rights Act.   
 Judicial recognition that the Convention rights and common law have the 
potential to coexist – to intertwine without the common law necessarily subjecting 
itself to the overriding demands of the Convention rights – has been apparent 
throughout the life of the Human Rights Act.
41
 The importance of recent Supreme 
Court statements on the ongoing relevance of the common law can be found in the 
explicit steer given to lower courts (and to advocates) considering rights questions to 
which domestic law may already provide answers and in their implicit attempts to 
offer a partial retort to one of the outstanding political controversies surrounding 
Human Rights Act adjudication.    
                                                 
39
 A, at [57]. 
40
 A, at [57].   
41
 R. (on the application of Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 
36; [2004] 1 A.C. 604, at [27] (Lord Steyn); JD v East Berkshire NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23; [2005] 
2 A.C. 373, at [50] (Lord Bingham); R. (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 1 A.C. 1312, at [53] 
(Baroness Hale).  See also: Sir Jack Beatson, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Technique’ in R. Masterman 
and I. Leigh (eds), The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and Comparative 
Perspectives (183 Proceedings of the British Academy) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).   
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IV. RE-EMPHASISING THE ‘NATIONAL’ 
The common law resurgence occurs within a larger context of political and legal 
discourse on the merits of domestic rights protection in preference to European 
sources of rights fulfilment,
42
 with responses to the perceived loss of national 
sovereignty over human rights questions likely to figure prominently in debates 
surrounding the 2015 UK General Election.  The judicial reiteration of the value of 
the common law to the protection of human rights places emphasis on the ‘national’ 
in the face of the ‘non-national’ qualities of the Convention rights and – in so doing – 
seeks to undercut perceptions that the Convention is a dominant ‘alien’ appendage 
which will necessarily override pre-existing domestic norms.
43
  
In this vein, recent judicial pronouncements on the issue of common law rights 
have gone beyond the resolution of the dispute in the case at hand towards bare 
assertions of the relevance of common law rights. Judges are contributing to 
generative discourse and the development of common law rights jurisprudence by 
admonishing lawyers to refrain from reflexive and automatic reliance on the 
Convention; the Supreme Court has repeatedly urged that the ‘starting point’ is to 
survey ‘the common law scene’.44 This perspective encourages us to treat the 
common law as the primary tool for rights protection and is analogous to a 
domestically-developed presumption in favour of subsidiarity, which allocates 
decision-making first to the local level and only moves to more centralised decision-
making as a secondary step. Usually, subsidiarity is applied as a preference for local, 
lower level authorities as the first stage of decision-making and administration. In the 
current context, it is the substantive law, rather than the institution that takes centre 
stage but the motivations are similar. The emphasis of the courts on the mechanism of 
rights protection through the common law evinces preference for domestic 
                                                 
42
 See: M. Pinto-Duschinsky, Brining Rights Back Home: Making Human Rights Compatible with 
Parliamentary Democracy in the United Kingdom (London: Policy Exchange, 2011); Commission on a 
Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (December 2012).  
43
 Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2002] EWCA 239; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2491, at [17].  
44
 Kennedy, at [46] (Lord Mance); Av BBC, at [57] (Lord Reed). 
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mechanisms and domestic legal sources over law with a more European heritage.
45
 
Indeed, this approach is consistent with both the ethos of the Convention and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on the relationship between 
domestic law and authorities and the Convention law and Convention organs. 
Certainly, several articles in the Convention, including Article 1 on the obligation of 
states to secure Convention rights, indicate that primary responsibility for securing 
rights resides as the domestic level. This sentiment is echoed in the article 13 right to 
an effective remedy and the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies in article 
35. This position was recently put beyond doubt through the amendment introduced 
by Article 1 of Protocol 15: ‘the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and 
freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto’. The primary function 
of domestic law is further supported by the European Court’s reiterations of ‘the 
fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention’.46  
 Yet the UK courts have not resolved the inconsistency in treating the rights 
protected in Schedule 1 of the HRA as distinct from ‘domestic law’. If the subsidiarity 
principle is applicable, as recent decisions suggest, then the HRA (which protects the 
Convention rights in the Schedule), exists as part of the bundle of national legal 
protections, alongside other statutes and common law. However, in urging that 
domestic law, including the common law scene, ought to be the first step, the 
potential exists for the Human Rights Act to be sidelined. The court frames the issue 
as a question of ‘the relationship between domestic law (considered apart from the 
Human Rights Act) and Convention rights.’47 This suggests that the tension between 
embracing the Human Rights Act as a domestic bill of rights and treating it as a tool 
for national courts to enforce the European Convention remains unresolved and that 
judicial (and political) assessment of the Act continues to tend strongly towards the 
latter.  This ‘internationalist’48 vision of the Human Rights Act has two consequences 
                                                 
45
 H. Petzold, “The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity” in R.St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher 
and H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp.41-62.  
46
 Hatton v United Kingdom (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 611, at [97], cited in Osborn, at [56]. 
47
 Osborn, at [54] (emphasis added). 
48
 B. Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p.00. 
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that are of relevance to this debate.  First, in a perpetuation of the dualist tradition, it 
treats the Convention rights as being distinct from – rather than as being 
complementary to – pre-existing common law sources of rights.  Secondly, it assumes 
the superiority of the Convention case law to the extent that principles of domestic 
common law have been effectively trumped in order to give effect to decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  The combination of these factors – the adoption or 
mirroring of the Strasbourg position in the domestic context – had already been 
highlighted as exercising an excessively restrictive influence over domestic judicial 
decision making by a number of Supreme Court Justices.
49
 The reiteration of the 
relevance of the common law to the ongoing protection of rights in the United 
Kingdom further highlights the inadequacy of the mirror metaphor.
50
   
In truth, there is no proper accounting for consideration of the Human Rights 
Act as ‘apart from’ other domestic laws.  As Laws LJ noted in 2002,   
 
… the court’s task under the Human Rights Act 1998, in this context as in 
many others, is not simply to add on the Strasbourg learning to the corpus of 
English law, as if it were a compulsory adjunct taken from an alien source, but 
to develop a municipal law of human rights by the incremental method of the 
common law, case by case, taking account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence as 
section 2 of the 1998 Act enjoins us to do.
51
 
 
Lord Reed is also therefore correct to note – as he did in A v British Broadcasting 
Corporation – that the Human Rights Act envisages interplay between the domestic 
and the international and that the common law may be in need of refinement in order 
to satisfy the (potentially) more exacting requirements of the Convention rights.   
The court’s reassertion of domestic law in rights protection speaks not only to 
a domestic audience wary of Strasbourg overreach, but also a second audience: the 
                                                 
49
 See for instance: Ambrose v Harris [2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2435, at [126]-[130]; Lord 
Kerr, ‘The UK Supreme Court – the Modest Underworker of Strasbourg?’, Clifford Chance Lecture, 25 
January 2012.   
50
 See: R. Masterman, ‘Deconstructing the Mirror Principle’ in R. Masterman and I. Leigh (eds), The 
United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (183 
Proceedings of the British Academy) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).   
51
 Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2002] EWCA 239; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2491, at [17].  
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European Court of Human Rights itself.  The armour of Strasbourg has been pierced 
in a sense within the past decade. In relation to the UK, the fallibility of Strasbourg 
and the potential for assertiveness on the part of national courts was highlighted in the 
series of cases related to the fairness of convictions based solely or decisively on 
witness statements. The Chamber initially ruled that convictions secured in those 
circumstances were inconsistent with Article 6. The statement of the Supreme Court 
in Horncastle that the Strasbourg Court had failed to sufficiently appreciate UK 
domestic law relating to hearsay was a pivotal moment in the interaction between 
Strasbourg and domestic courts. Subsequent to the Horncastle judgment, the Grand 
Chamber accepted some of the Supreme Court’s criticisms in a ruling in the Al-
Khawaja case which raised similar issues to those confronted in Horncastle.
52
 The 
Strasbourg Court thereby indicated a willingness to engage with and listen to 
domestic courts on the consistency of domestic law with the ECHR.  
 As the Horncastle episode demonstrates, when the Strasbourg Court’s 
jurisprudence is unsettled or unclear, the dialogue between national courts and the 
European Court provides conceptual space for the continuing operation of common 
law rights and principles. In Kennedy, where Strasbourg authorities were ‘neither 
clear nor easy to reconcile’53 on the question whether article 10 imposed an obligation 
on the state to disclose information, the Supreme Court confidently permitted the 
common law to lead on the right to access documents related to inquiries conducted 
by the Charity Commission. Assertion of the role of common law in such 
circumstances is supported by the terms of the Human Rights Act, section 11 of 
which makes it clear that a person’s reliance on Convention rights does not restrict 
other rights or freedoms to which he or she may be entitled under domestic law.  
 
V. CONCEPTUALISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMON 
LAW AND THE CONVENTION 
Looking back at the ebb and flow of the case law, at least three ways of 
conceptualising the dynamic between common law rights and Convention rights are 
revealed. First, there is the perception that the Human Rights Act (and associated 
Convention rights) should be treated as a primary means of rights protection, with 
                                                 
52
 Al-Khawaja v United Kingdom (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 23 [130]-[151]. 
53
 Kennedy, at [59] 
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common law rights viewed as simply supplementary or secondary. Given that the 
ability of the common law to protect human rights had been dealt a serious blow by 
the Strasbourg decision in Smith and Grady and the statutory direction provided by 
the Human Rights Act towards enforcing a defined catalogue of rights, it is no 
surprise that this approach has tended to dominate. As typified by the Osborn case, in 
which the submissions focused on Article 5 of the Convention but were largely 
inattentive to common law, human rights practice and discourse came to centre 
around the Human Rights Act and Convention rights, a tendency which is now 
bemoaned by senior members of the judiciary and the bar.
54
   
 A second approach is to perceive the common law as a conduit for the 
fulfilment of rights guaranteed by the Convention. On this reading, the common law 
becomes the vehicle through which the Convention rights may be realised, and may 
be susceptible to change prompted by the requirements of the Convention. This 
approach has been embraced, for instance, in the development of the breach of 
confidence doctrine since the enactment of the Human Rights Act. The extent 
however to which that doctrine has been transformed – with Articles 8 and 10 of the 
Convention in effect now forming ‘the very content of the domestic tort’55 – 
demonstrates that there may be only a fine conceptual distinction between this 
approach and the direct application of the Convention rights. This understanding is 
empowering insofar as the common law is viewed as possessing (and being able to 
deliver upon) rights protecting properties.  However, in this approach, the value of the 
common law in the rights sphere appears to be limited to its instrumentality to the 
ends of the Convention.  
Third, the common law may be treated as the primary vessel for rights 
protection, supplemented – where necessary – by Convention rights.  On this final 
approach, the maintenance of the integrity of the common law, and (perhaps) of its 
distinctive national characteristics, is paramount. It is this third conception, which 
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perceives the Convention rights as being supplementary to the common law, that is 
reflected in the most recent cases from the Supreme Court. Judicial admonitions to 
survey the common law scene before having recourse to Convention rights, transmit a 
belief in the priority of common law over international law (including its application 
via the Human Rights Act). Recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate that the first 
point of inquiry in rights adjudication must be domestic law and that within the 
domestic framework common law principles are of particular value in conditioning 
the interpretation of statutes and providing substantive principles of ‘[w]hat we now 
term human rights law and public law.’56 Yet, the implications of this turn must not be 
overstated. First, the primacy of the common law encouraged by this conception is not 
a hierarchical primacy; it is a sequential primacy. It conveys the notion that the 
common law ought to be engaged before turning to the Convention, but not that the 
common law is the sole or dominant source of rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that where there is conflict between the domestic law (including common 
law) and the Convention rights, effect must be given to the Convention in accordance 
with the HRA.
57
 Secondly, without providing an explanation as to why the Human 
Rights Act – and the attendant Convention rights – should continue to be considered 
as ‘apart’58 from the remaining corpus of domestic law this view cannot fully account 
for the interplay between sources of rights protection currently operable in the United 
Kingdom. Without a more complete articulation of the circumstances in which the 
common law should take apparent precedence over rights given force by virtue of 
primary legislation, there is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that this third 
view will emerge as the overall dominant conception of the relationship between 
Convention rights and the common law.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The common law rights resurgence takes place within an apparently broader 
reaffirmation of the relevance of the common law to constitutional adjudication in the 
United Kingdom. This wider trend can also be seen in two of the most notable 
decisions in the, to date, short life of the United Kingdom Supreme Court.  In AXA 
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General Insurance v Lord Advocate the Supreme Court found that devolved 
institutions were (in addition to review on the grounds specified in the devolution 
statutes) additionally subject to review on common law grounds.
59
 More recently still, 
in the HS2 decision the common law recognition of principles integral to the 
realisation of the rule of law was highlighted with some force.
60
 While the precise 
effect of these principles was left open by the Supreme Court in HS2, their existence 
was agreed upon explicitly by all seven of the deciding justices.
61
 In the face of calls 
for revision of the current statutory scheme for the protection of human rights, and in 
the light of a nascent movement towards documenting the United Kingdom’s 
constitution,
62
 the common law is showing signs not only of resilience but also of its 
continuing ability to recalibrate itself in the face of new challenges and current needs.  
The recent case law encourages the conceptualisation of the common law as an 
autonomous track of rights protection; one that is not insulated from the Convention 
but which operates as an independent source of rights, and may, as it develops, be 
influenced by the ECHR. 
In the ongoing debates over the perceptions of supremacy of national and 
international sources of law, the reiteration of the common law’s vitality in the face of 
the Convention rights amounts to a partial rejoinder to calls for a United Kingdom 
Bill of Rights based on the dilution of domestic authority over rights. More broadly 
assessed, the above cases also contribute to the incremental development of the 
common law constitution. The potential of neither should be lightly dismissed; this 
‘gradual adaptation’, to use Lord Toulson’s phrase, ‘has always been the way of the 
common law’.63 Thus, while the HRA sought to ‘bring rights home’ from Strasbourg, 
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the common law’s resurgence, fuelled by its unique adaptability, protests that rights 
were already and continue to be a part of the British ‘national inheritance.’64 
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